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.........................................................
The Arab Spring revealed the talent and potential of Arab youth long under-
mined by inhospitable political environments. It revealed the perils of the status 
quo. It also exposed one of the most tragic byproducts of authoritarianism: 
wasted talent. 
The organizers of the recent protests in Egypt and elsewhere displayed the 
skills and savvy of U.S. politicians running for office. They used the Internet 
to advertise their agenda, rally the masses, and build solidarity. To reach the 
disconnected, they provided fodder for television stations and paraded through 
poor neighborhoods, strategically adjusting their emphasis from “better poli-
tics” to “better paychecks.” 
Yet for all their creativity and dynamism, in the months following the protests 
they have struggled to make the leap from advocacy to policymaking. The odds 
were stacked against them from the start. Bureaucratic repression meant that 
these activists spent more of their lives blogging about political iniquities than 
they did engaging with political systems. Indeed, the corruption of the old sys-
tem led many to conclude that all politics were corrupt, and they wanted no 
part of politics. Lifetimes of exclusion from political processes prevented them 
from learning how to develop coherent platforms, extract concessions from the 
powerful, and negotiate with other stakeholders. The so-called Facebook kids 
spurred “faceless revolutions”1 with no clear leaders or platforms to fill the void.
The short term is unlikely to be kind to them. As realism eclipses idealism and 
the political landscape becomes increasingly fragmented and complex, more con-
ventional and seasoned political actors are likely to sideline the Facebook kids. 
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The long term holds out greater prospects for this group. 
The activists’ most enduring achievement was not imple-
menting radical change above, but helping transform at-
titudes and expectations below. More than ever, young 
people feel a stake in their country’s future and a desire to 
address public policy problems standing in its way. Gov-
ernments, by turn, face a need to devise better solutions to 
these problems than they have been able to in the past.
With the winds of change blowing through the Arab world, 
the time is ripe for supporting a more robust policy envi-
ronment in the region. Over time, a disciplined and coor-
dinated effort can help nurture an environment in which 
younger generations are more intimately connected with 
policymaking and where political debate occurs outside the 
blogosphere, among individuals and civil society organi-
zations and their governments. Such an environment will 
contribute to enhancing the peace and security of the region 
and of the United States as well. The gains will not be im-
mediate, but the impact will be enduring.
This paper explores ways in which external actors can tar-
get support for a more robust public policy environment in 
the Middle East. Drawing on interviews in the region and 
original research, it will identify common threads in terms 
of government receptivity to outside input and suggest 
ways in which that input can be targeted to have optimal 
effect. It will also offer examples in which external actors 
have been able to nurture durable relationships that build 
and sustain policy communities in other parts of the world. 
These recommendations are not intended to be accom-
plished in the short term. The revolts in Egypt and Tuni-
sia revealed the relative swiftness of removing the old as 
compared to the arduous process of creating the new. De-
veloping human capital and strengthening public policy 
environments require long-term investment and sustained 
commitment. On the human capital side, time and energy 
must be invested in creating the kinds of scholars who can 
write accessibly and practically, and who are willing to sac-
rifice the freedom of academic endeavors in exchange for 
greater policy influence. Such an investment must be sus-
tained over years, helping to support the development of 
younger scholars as they establish their careers. For some, 
an important component of this process will be related to 
language. The ability to communicate effectively and per-
suasively in English not only remains a necessity for policy 
effectiveness, it is becoming more critical than ever. Invest-
ing in such capability among up-and-coming scholars will 
be an important component for expanding the pool of peo-
ple who can operate effectively in the policy field.
Nor are these recommendations necessarily intuitive. On 
the question of environment, it is necessary to examine 
the kinds of policy issues on which Middle Eastern gov-
ernments are most receptive to outside advice, considering 
the entire ecosystem in which public policy institutions ex-
ist and helping to construct a business model under which 
such institutions could thrive. To do so, it will be necessary 
to invest in areas that may seem peripheral to the key in-
terests of donor groups. It will also require donor restraint, 
not short-circuiting the process of indigenous growth that is 
necessary for Middle Eastern public policy organizations to 
emerge as strong and relatively independent organizations. 
political environment
The weakness of public policy discourse in the Middle East 
is both a cause and an effect of a weak policymaking en-
vironment. Authoritarian governments, allocative politics, 
and weak civil society institutions all militate against the 
sorts of exchanges between nongovernmental institutions 
and government decisionmakers that help leaven and im-
prove governmental decisions.
The relative isolation of policy processes from public scru-
tiny not only weakens governments’ ability to shape robust 
policies in response to a variety of internal and external 
challenges. It also disaffects experts who could be play-
ing a constructive role now and in the future, undermines 
public support for government decisionmaking, and makes 
any sort of innovation or entrepreneurship difficult if not 
impossible.
diversity
Despite certain commonalities, there is also considerable 
diversity in the Middle East. Some Middle Eastern coun-
More than ever, young people feel a stake 
in their country’s future and a desire to 
address public policy problems standing 
in its way. Governments, by turn, face a 
need to devise better solutions to these 
problems than they have been able to in 
the past. 
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tries are wealthy while others are poor. In some, political 
debate is carried out through shouts and threats, while in 
others it is carried out in little more than a whisper. Some 
have a large pool of educated graduates from which to draw, 
and others seize on every young person showing promise. 
In addition, each country is facing different problems, and 
many concentrate on problems that they see as domestic 
rather than regional. Planning for growth in water and elec-
tricity demand, revising education curricula, and thinking 
about women’s entry into the workforce are common issues 
around the region, but conditions are sufficiently different 
in each country and the politics around them are sufficiently 
delicate that governments treat them as internal issues. As 
such, ways to support a more robust internal decisionmak-
ing environment will vary by country, condition, and issue. 
Nevertheless, some regional trends are clear. 
receptivity to input
There is no question that there is a tremendous appetite for 
public policy expertise in the Middle East, and there has 
been for a long time. In the post-colonial period, European- 
and U.S.-educated elites were essential to the operations 
of newly independent governments. With the departure of 
colonial officials, young Arab graduates of Western univer-
sities provided vital technical and managerial talent to gov-
ernments starving for it. In the middle of the last century, 
Levantine technocrats helped build the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) states up from Bedouin encampments. 
Today, more than ever, governments across the region in-
creasingly see the need to improve the quality of what they 
do. In earlier decades, guaranteed government employment 
was an incentive for young people to complete their educa-
tions, and their continued employment was both an impor-
tant part of the social safety net and an important way to 
generate loyalty for the government. Many Middle Eastern 
governments continue to spend upwards of 20 percent of 
their yearly expenditures on civil servant salaries (see fig-
ure 1). However, as populations have grown and the tasks 
of governance have become more complicated, the govern-
ment’s role as employer of last resort—and, sometimes, of 
first resort—has come under strain. Increasingly, the orga-
nizations and personnel of the past are inadequate to meet 
current, let alone future, needs.
The growth of international financial institutions requires 
national capacity to interact with those organizations; the 
rise of international trade requires more people comfortable 
with international business. Equally importantly, the inter-
national scrutiny applied to local conditions, populations’ 
awareness of conditions outside their own countries, the 
diffusion of technology, and the high velocity of change af-
fecting the Middle East all push toward governments with 
a high degree of competence and adaptability. The tasks of 
government itself have become more complex, requiring an 
ability to estimate future demand rather than merely meet 
that of the present. 
In response, governments have taken limited steps to re-
invent themselves. One manifestation of this has been the 
way in which governments have become avid consumers of 
executive education programs for their employees, whether 
at the American University in Cairo, the Dubai School of 
Government, or other institutions around the region. Such 
training programs focus for the most part on teaching people 
Today, more than ever, governments across 
the region increasingly see the need to 
improve the quality of what they do.
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how to do things better rather than on telling them what to 
do. That is to say, they tend to feature coursework on strate-
gic planning, performance management, human resources, 
and budgeting rather than evolving trends in telecommuni-
cations regulation, for example. Nevertheless, they clearly 
seek to introduce new processes into government opera-
tions, rethinking the role of employees and empowering 
them to take bolder steps within their competencies.
A second trend has been to turn to international consulting 
firms to provide advice. Several international consulting 
firms, from McKinsey to Booz & Company to the Monitor 
Group, have robust public sector practices in the Middle 
East. They tend to recruit a mix of Western-educated Arabs 
as well as expatriates who work in a wide variety of areas. 
In some cases, the firms provide technical information, such 
as the work outside consulting firms did to help build Plan 
Abu Dhabi 2030. A distinguished group of international ad-
visers counseled the Abu Dhabi government on such issues 
as environmental considerations, land use, transportation, 
and open space for an Abu Dhabi of the future.2 In other 
cases, consultants have become adjuncts of the government 
itself. When the Ministry of Health in Egypt was working 
with the World Bank to establish a health insurance project 
in Egypt in 2009, for example, it was McKinsey consultants 
rather than employees of the Ministry of Health who rep-
resented the ministry.3 Although the consultants themselves 
were Egyptian nationals, the ministry leadership perceived 
these individuals to be of sufficient international exposure 
and caliber as to be unwilling to work directly for the Egyp-
tian government.4 
Governments have also demonstrated an interest in en-
hancing their technical expertise to help them deal with 
specialized international institutions (such as international 
financial institutions). In several cases, governments have 
adopted higher, non-civil-service pay scales to attract high-
ly qualified nationals to these jobs, but they remain relative-
ly isolated from the ministry as a whole and do not foresee 
long-term civil service employment as their career goal.
In Lebanon, for example, the government has established 
a unit within the Ministry of Finance to provide macro-
economic policy advice and help develop and implement 
economic reform strategies. The ministry uses UN De-
velopment Program (UNDP) funds to hire approximately 
40 Lebanese at non-civil-service pay scales (and without 
civil service benefits) to work on technical issues such as 
customs reform, taxation, and debt strategies. Specialists 
in this program also provide legal assistance on issues 
related to tax conventions and agreements.5 Similarly, in 
Egypt, the Mubarak government brought approximately 
100 young Egyptians into the Finance Ministry on a sort of 
“fast track” that included augmented salaries and extensive 
training, including training in teamwork skills. Because of 
a seven-year freeze in government hiring and the increas-
ing unattractiveness of government employment in Egypt, 
the ministry was reportedly top-heavy with expertise and 
felt an urgent need to nurture its rising talent. Virtually all 
of the participants in the fast-track program in Egypt were 
graduates of the American University in Cairo, and many 
had been classmates there.6
Finally, in many GCC countries, demographic challenges 
weigh heavily on leaders’ minds, and governments have 
sought to identify and cultivate all the young native talent 
they can get their hands on. In the United Arab Emirates, 
for instance, the government gives promising young Emi-
ratis training and exposure by setting up pockets of true 
excellence in the government. One such institution is the 
Executive Affairs Authority (EAA), which is closely con-
nected to the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Muhammad bin 
Zayed. Comprising approximately 30 Emiratis and 20 ex-
patriates, the EAA exists as an incubator for local talent, 
providing talented young Emiratis with training, interna-
tional exposure, and a string of challenging assignments. 
Clearly seen as a select institution within the government 
because of its close association with the crown prince and 
the visible strategic efforts that he supports, the EAA is an 
elite group of government employees in an environment in 
which most people in the workforce expect a guarantee of 
government employment.
obstacles to input
Yet, despite the need for an increase in getting outside help 
to boost governmental capacity, the appetite for public poli-
cy advice has significant limits. On the whole, governments 
have shown more interest in getting advice on public ad-
ministration than on public policy. That is to say, they have 
shown more receptivity to improving their tactics of policy 
implementation than to obtaining advice on the strategies 
of governance. 
More importantly, many of the issues of most concern to 
international audiences—peace and security, counter-radi-
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calization, religious tolerance, democratization, and human 
rights—are reserved as prerogatives of the rulers. It is not 
a coincidence that among GCC members, every minister 
of defense, foreign affairs, and interior is a member of the 
royal family, and many are siblings or other close relatives 
of the ruler.7 The region’s republics maintain looser con-
trol over the ministers, but the ruler’s personal and unchal-
lenged control over issues of peace and security is a con-
stant.8
While political contexts differ from country to country, 
there is little tradition of openly weighing alternatives sup-
ported by different interest groups. Instead, lobbying is 
done in private, with an expectation of personal relief from 
a ruler rather than a holistic approach that serves the com-
mon interest. Even rarer is a desire to mobilize a coalition 
of interest groups to seek change, perhaps out of fear that 
mobilizing a coalition would send a signal that the pub-
lic should be active rather than passive in seeking policy 
change.
Rulers do not insist on making all the decisions themselves. 
Issues such as macroeconomic policy, mineral extraction, 
and arms control, for example, all require deeply special-
ized knowledge, and rulers are content to leave the details 
to experts as long as they can set the broad agenda. Edu-
cation, infrastructure, and health care economics are ex-
amples of wholly domestic issues where outside advice is 
also accepted. Increasingly, outside advice is also needed. 
Throughout the Middle East, educational systems tend to 
emphasize rote memorization over critical thinking, even at 
the most specialized levels. Moreover, university graduates 
often hold degrees in social sciences and humanities rather 
than in more marketable fields such as science and engi-
neering (see figure 2).9 Without the right balance of skills 
and expertise, graduates end up with few job prospects. In 
wealthier states, they can generally gain government em-
ployment, with the government hiring foreign technocrats 
to do what their domestic workforce cannot. In poorer 
countries, the prospects are even dimmer, and many gradu-
ates spend years between completing their education and 
starting their first job.
There is also room for greater consultation when the rulers 
feel confident that consultation is private and they them-
selves can take credit for initiatives that may have origi-
nated elsewhere. There is no expectation, however, that the 
press should play a role in airing a range of alternative argu-
ments, nor is there a press prepared to play that role any-
…many of the issues of most concern to 
international audiences—peace and se-
curity, counter-radicalization, religious 
tolerance, democratization, and human 
rights—are reserved as prerogatives of the 
rulers. It is not a coincidence that among 
GCC members, every minister of defense, 
foreign affairs, and interior is a member 
of the royal family, and many are siblings 
or other close relatives of the ruler.
Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
Figure 2. Higher Education Graduates in Select Middle Eastern Countries, 2009
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where in the region. Further, there is a sense in some of the 
GCC states especially that the most dangerous thing to do 
would be to contradict government policy, thereby inhibit-
ing any kind of open debate on policy issues.10 
elsewhere in the world
The difficulty of targeting support for public policy en-
vironments in the Middle East is made more difficult by 
the scarcity of successful models for that type of support 
around the world. There are few international philanthropic 
efforts that seek to enhance the policymaking environment 
in a country or region and even fewer that have successfully 
built and sustained partnerships with policy communities 
abroad. That said, a few instances of sustained U.S. institu-
tional partnerships exist and are worth mentioning for the 
lessons they convey. 
Perhaps the quintessential example of early U.S. founda-
tion support was the Rockefeller Foundation’s support for 
the China Medical Board (CMB). Originally, the board es-
tablished Peking Union Medical College, a state-of-the-art 
medical school and teaching hospital. When the Chinese 
Revolution forced the board to abandon the institution in 
1950, the CMB became a health-oriented foundation oper-
ating throughout Asia. In its current incarnation, the CMB 
has regained its China focus but concentrates on a broader 
selection of institutions. It supports both medical and pub-
lic health research as well as policy-related workshops and 
studies.11 Operating off a $200 million endowment, the 
CMB gives grants of $7 million–$10 million per year. Until 
recently, it used to fund a core of 13 medical institutions in 
China; it has now shifted to emphasize an application pro-
cess intended to broaden the reach of the program into rural 
areas with greater unmet health care needs.12
While seemingly unrelated to the public policy efforts at 
the heart of this paper, the CMB holds many lessons for an 
effort to boost the public policy environment. It operates in 
a world of public policy and has established a positive rela-
tionship with health care professionals in the areas it serves. 
In addition, in its current incarnation, it bolsters rather than 
directs the efforts and business models of the institutions it 
supports. In this way, it seeks to enhance capacity develop-
ment, supporting efforts to improve training curricula and 
textbooks, adapting existing models to local conditions, 
and convening stakeholders. 
Another interesting institution, also funded principally 
through an endowment, is the Central European University 
(CEU). Chartered 20 years ago with the explicit mandate to 
help the countries of Central and Eastern Europe transition 
to the post-communist era, proceeds from the university’s 
endowment cover 80 percent of operating expenses.13 Al-
though the university was founded with a regional focus, in 
recent years it has sought to become more global. Now, al-
most 20 percent of its students are non-European,14 and the 
percentage is growing. Although the most popular course 
of study is business administration, which attracts almost 
a third of all students, the university has substantial enroll-
ments in law, environmental studies and policy, political 
science, economics, and public policy.15 
CEU is both an institute of higher education and an incuba-
tor for policy-relevant thinking. Although still under for-
mation, a school of public and international affairs intends 
to enroll up to 200 students, which would rival the largest 
program at the university.16 The university as a whole ac-
tively looks to recruit students who have a commitment to 
democratic reform efforts and who want to make a differ-
ence in their own countries.17 In addition, a number of joint 
academic initiatives focus on policy-related areas, such as 
PUBPOLTRANS (which examines the economic issues 
involved in the transition to market economies), AQUA-
TRAIN (which looks at soil and groundwater protection), 
and ELECDEM (which trains election researchers). Final-
ly, because so much of the university’s funding is derived 
from a gift from George Soros, there is a special connec-
tion to the Open Society Institute, Soros’ nongovernmental 
organization.
CEU appears to benefit from the fact that the political en-
vironment in Central Europe is more permissive of foreign 
engagement than is the political environment in the Middle 
East. The region having recently thrown off the yoke of 
communism, there does not appear to be an undercurrent of 
resentment that the university’s programs—and especially 
its commitment to engagement in the policy process—rep-
resent efforts to manipulate local politics for foreign ends. 
Such claims would likely resonate far more in a Middle 
Eastern context. At least part of CEU’s acceptance comes 
from a broad sense that political change is both inevitable 
and desirable, a premise that is more contested in a Middle 
East context.
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A well-established though less applicable model is the 
longstanding effort at the University of Nebraska-Omaha 
(UNO) to help support the people of Afghanistan. The Cen-
ter for Afghanistan Studies (CAS) was the initial unit of 
UNO’s international studies program, founded in 1973. Re-
lying on external funding rather than on university support, 
the center has obtained more than $80 million in grants 
over its lifetime. Principally oriented around strengthening 
the Afghan education sector, the center has produced text-
books and instructional kits and has helped train more than 
8,500 educators, 80 percent of whom are female.18
The center has managed to brave shifting politics in Af-
ghanistan over the last four decades in part because of its 
uncontroversial mission, but also because it seeks to be 
wholly Afghan and wholly neutral. With contacts in 32 of 
Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, it has had no full-time expatri-
ate staff in Afghanistan for the last seven years.19 Yet, the 
center has never been able to establish a business model that 
has made its activities sustainable in the Afghan context, 
nor has it been able to expand its purview much beyond 
education work. In addition, the center has relied largely on 
U.S. government funding and thus must be responsive to 
the U.S. funding environment rather than Afghans’ needs. 
The center is a resource for Afghans seeking to come to the 
United States and a resource for those in the international 
community in Afghanistan, but it has largely responded to 
its environment rather than sought to shape it.
what is to be done?
Given what we know about conditions in the Middle East, 
and what we know about efforts around the world to help 
shape the public policy environment, several opportunities 
suggest themselves.
1.	Enhance	receptivity	to	public	policy	discussions.	
As suggested above, Middle Eastern governments are will-
ing to take outside advice, but they are reluctant to take 
it in public and they are loath to have their primacy chal-
lenged. Forgoing some of the hot-button issues in order to 
invest in building receptivity among government audiences 
is a good short-term step. As a senior official in the United 
Arab Emirates observed, there is discomfort with the idea 
of public lobbying, and it is difficult for people to oppose 
the government. Creating a multitude of views around a 
less controversial topic can help socialize government of-
ficials to the idea that public comment and public engage-
ment need not be threatening.
In addition, fostering a larger number of discussions that 
bring together government officials, academics, and out-
side experts for focused discussions on shared concerns can 
help create the informal ties that facilitate future interac-
tion. Further, it can reinforce to officials who are unused to 
outside input the value of such input, and it can help experts 
understand the nature of the questions that government of-
ficials are considering so as to better tailor their own work 
for those needs. 
Yet, to have maximum impact, discussions should center 
on issues of importance to the countries themselves. To 
date, much of the Western-supported dialogue with public 
policy institutions has been intended to facilitate dialogue 
between the West and the target states on issues of concern 
to the West. While this serves the interests of Western par-
ticipants, it limits the impact and influence of target state 
participants in their own systems. Creating greater space 
for Arab participants to influence their own countries’ do-
mestic debates is important. At least initially, the requisite 
space is probably best created by having discussions about 
issues that remain policy relevant but are less sensitive 
to the leaderships in their countries. Education standards, 
while politically sensitive in some regards, are of suffi-
ciently broad interest to play such a role, as is economics. 
Trying to force discussions about Arab-Israeli normaliza-
tion, regional security architectures, and political participa-
tion are likely to evoke the kind of resistance that closes 
up space for dialogue. Even in Lebanon, which has a rela-
tively open political system, one observer in the NGO com-
munity commented that “having an impact would lead to 
To date, much of the Western-supported 
dialogue with public policy institutions 
has been intended to facilitate dialogue 
between the West and the target states 
on issues of concern to the West. While 
this serves the interests of Western par-
ticipants, it limits the impact and influ-
ence of target state participants in their 
own systems. 
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nalism is unconstrained by both space and financial inter-
ests, there are tremendous opportunities to develop it as a 
supplement to traditional journalism on policy-related top-
ics. The problems of online journalism are problems of ac-
countability and audience. That is to say, anyone can say 
anything online, but no one necessarily reads it. Targeted 
external support can help build the skills of online content 
creators and can help explore ways to market those ideas to 
wider audiences in country.
2.	Create	a	sustainable	business	model.	
The public policy universe in the Middle East does not have 
a healthy business model because each institution tends to 
rely on a single donor. Most rely on the governments them-
selves, making it more difficult to gain the necessary space 
to take a fresh look at policies and sometimes saddling these 
institutions with the same government personnel practices 
that make it difficult to accomplish things in government. 
A few rely on foreign donors, either from the West (as the 
Carnegie Endowment’s Beirut office) or from neighboring 
countries (such as the Gulf Research Center, which until 
recently was based in Dubai and is funded principally by 
its chairman, a Saudi). A few, such as Beirut’s Issam Fares 
Institute, enjoy domestic funding, but as is the case with 
any organization with a single principal donor, sustaining 
that relationship without becoming captured by it, and sus-
taining it beyond the donor’s interest in the topic, can be 
difficult (see table 1).22 
The environment would be further strengthened if each or-
ganization had multiple sources of funding to give it inde-
pendence from any one funding source. Government fund-
ing is helpful in some measure because it helps ensure that 
government officials have a stake in the results, but wholly 
governmental funding tends to stifle creativity. Similarly, 
international support should not be the principal source of 
funding for any organization, not least because sustaining 
foreign donors distracts the organization from developing 
ties in its own country.
A sustainable funding model applies not just to the organi-
zation as a whole, but also to activities within the organiza-
tion. Research funding is an important tool with which to 
incentivize researchers and reward promising avenues of 
research. Researchers should feel some pressure to be pro-
ductive and some pressure to produce work that finds a re-
ceptive audience. Academics are not always attuned to the 
conflict,”20 and to risk-averse behaviors among think tanks 
engaged in public policy work. Having impact on less in-
flammatory issues would help create receptivity to broader 
engagement.
Training more journalists to report on public policy discus-
sions is also important. This entails both enhancing jour-
nalists’ ability to capture all sides of a debate and creating 
space in newspapers for them to report on such a debate. 
At this point, the think tank discussions are relatively rari-
fied. A senior journalist in Cairo suggested that think tanks 
in Egypt have an audience only among a “core elite” of a 
few thousand, rather than a broader “attentive public” of 
2–3 million.21 Having journalists better understand how to 
report on think tank work, and having think tanks work on 
issues that are of broader significance, can help address this 
divide.
The problem of scant press coverage of public policy issues 
is not merely a consequence of a lack of public policy writ-
ings on which to report. In part, it is a consequence of a press 
environment that tends to veer between sensationalism and 
the rewriting of press releases, and that does not reward care-
ful scrutiny or long-form reporting. Journalists often lack the 
training for investigative reporting, and editors see scant re-
ward in developing such stories. In addition, the dramatic 
shift toward television, and the rise of regional outlets over 
local ones, privileges simple and graphic stories that appeal 
to international audiences rather than stories that explore the 
tasks of governance. Creating a market for public policy dis-
cussion will necessarily mean working to expand the out-
lets in which such discussion can occur, and that will require 
more than working with government officials to allow such 
outlets to publish. In addition, it will require working with 
reporters and editors to further strengthen their capacity to 
do public policy reporting and to build a commitment to such 
reporting in the future.
The rise of an informal journalistic culture through blogs 
and websites creates additional opportunities to expand 
policy discussions to a public audience. As online jour-
The public policy universe in the Middle 
East does not have a healthy business 
model because each institution tends to 
rely on a single donor.
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demand for their work, and public policy work in particular 
needs to be shaped with an audience and a policy outcome 
in mind. One way to incentivize researchers would be to 
have an award system whereby a combination of Arab and 
Western personalities would evaluate public policy research 
for its intellectual rigor and policy effectiveness. Such an 
award could highlight areas of particular accomplishment 
and model effective policy advocacy in the broader policy 
community.
Long-term institutional mentoring would contribute to the 
sustainability of the institution as well as the partnership. In 
such an environment, administrators could talk about such 
issues as staff recruitment and development, fundraising, 
policy advocacy and outreach, and a host of other concerns. 
Such an arrangement would also likely lead to institutional 
partnerships, but as there are few institutions in Western 
countries that have a wholly Middle Eastern focus, the par-
ticipants from the Western side would likely be generalists 
with a focus on institution building rather than experts with 
a stake in developing policy prescriptions for the target 
countries.
This institutional mentorship could extend to the legal do-
main. In many places in the Middle East, the concept of 
a nonprofit organization does not exist. In some countries, 
there are not even political parties. While much of the work 
that policy institutes would do is of principal interest to a 
single country, creating a solid legal framework for inde-
pendent policy discussions is important in every country, 
and having a model law to establish such institutions is an 
important step.
3.	Create	a	supply	of	policy	entrepreneurs	who	can	
enrich	and	enliven	the	policy	debate.	
Such entrepreneurs need to think of themselves as neither 
academics nor employees, but rather as innovators, experts, 
cheerleaders, and advocates. In point of fact, such skills are 
not in wide supply in any society, much less in societies 
without a strong public policy tradition. Nurturing the de-
velopment of such talents requires a series of investments. 
Academic training is a requirement for accomplishment in 
this field, and there should be some support for academic 
work. Ideally, the level of academic accomplishment would 
vary within the institution. While not all researchers should 
have PhDs, a PhD is a marker of a scholar’s ability to work 
independently. At the same time, the PhD is sometimes a 
marker of individuals who are so self-directed that they are 
unaccustomed to working to sustain an audience. Even pub-
lic policy degrees can raise eyebrows. One thought leader 
in the UAE government expressed a strong preference for 
MBAs over MPPs;24 a young Lebanese involved in policy 
research suggested that academics always appear to be “in 
discussion mode” and have a problem moving from evalu-
ation to implementation. In addition, consultants’ work is 
premised on efficiency of delivery to the client, whereas 
academic products tend to prioritize the intellectual rigor 
and disciplinary integrity of the author.25 The public policy 
field needs to develop experts who understand and can op-
erate in the academic universe, but who can also translate it 
for policymakers who often want to get right to the answers 
and who rarely want to read more than a page of text. Think 
tanks can emerge as important institutions that reward work 
that draws on academic inquiry but is more accessible than 
standard academic work.
* Is in the process of relocating to Geneva, Switzerland; Cam-
bridge, UK; and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.23
Table 1. Major Middle Eastern Think Tanks and their 
Funding Sources 
Faisal Center (Saudi Ara-
bia)
Government sponsored
Center for Strategic Stud-
ies (Jordan)
Government sponsored
Al-Ahram Center (Egypt) Government sponsored
Emirates Center for Strate-
gic Studies (UAE)
Government sponsored
Issam Fares Institute (Leba-
non)
Principal donor
Gulf Research Center 
(UAE)*
Principal donor
Egypt’s International Eco-
nomic Forum
Principal donor
Carnegie Middle East Cen-
ter (Lebanon)
Endowment
Institute for National Stra-
tegic Studies (Israel)
Endowment, with 
government matching; 
outside contributions
Economic Research Forum 
(Egypt)
Foundations, interna-
tional and non-govern-
mental organizations
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Supporting efforts to strengthen English language skills 
is also critical to increasing accessibility to the political 
sphere. Although English is not a universal language, it is a 
lingua franca in most policy discussions in the Arab world. 
In part, the use of English reflects the internationalization 
of the debate on issues such as economics and social policy. 
Much of the global research is published in English, and 
results are generally shared in English. For example, 82 
percent of reports published by the Gulf Research Center 
since 2009 have been in English (see figure 3).26
Further, international donors sometimes fall into the trap of 
seeing English language fluency as a proxy for intellectual 
ability, drawing close to some who think sloppily and ex-
cluding many with important ideas that they have difficulty 
expressing in English. Put another way, a lack of English 
language fluency acts as an entry barrier for many aspiring 
policy actors, relegating them to routine bureaucratic exer-
cises and preventing them from being entrusted with truly 
creative work. While the goal of an effort to invigorate the 
public policy universe should be neither to translate all rel-
evant work into Arabic nor to morph merely into a language 
education program, at least some effort needs to be put into 
the problem of language and into identifying especially 
promising students for whom greater English proficiency 
would make a significant difference.
There should also be some investment in the cross-fertil-
ization between the government and the public policy com-
munity. It is hard for someone who has never worked in 
government to understand what might affect government, 
and it is hard for people inside government to always see 
the ways in which outside views can enrich their own work. 
In Lebanon, there is considerable enthusiasm in the NGO 
community around the fact that the former minister of the 
interior, Ziad Baroud, came out of the NGO sector, where 
he worked on election law. The minister’s background 
gave him both relationships to and sympathy for the non-
governmental sector, which created openings for a broader 
policy discussion. Exchange programs are one way to en-
courage cross-fertilization. The International Affairs Fel-
lowship of the Council on Foreign Relations in the United 
States, which encompasses about 12 participants per year, 
takes highly qualified young people principally from aca-
demic backgrounds and puts them in government, and it 
takes their counterparts in government and places them in 
academic and think tank settings. The experience creates 
greater receptivity to outside input.
Fellowships are another option. Giving fellowships for 
young and mid-career professionals to work in Western 
think tanks would expose them to both the policy process 
and the policy advocacy world. The important thing here 
would be to give people this opportunity when they have 
had sufficient training and experience to produce a policy-
relevant piece of scholarship without significant external 
support. Merely doing research for a senior scholar’s report 
is much less rewarding, and ultimately less instructive, than 
the process of conceptualizing and executing a project of 
one’s own. 
4.	Reward	success.	
Rewarding innovation and entrepreneurship in the policy 
realm is especially important where traditions of such ac-
Rewarding innovation and entrepreneur-
ship in the policy realm is especially im-
portant where traditions of such activi-
ties do not exist.
Figure 3. Gulf Research Center Original Reports,  
2009–present*
82%
18%
Ar bic
English
Gulf Research Center 
original reports,* 
2009-present
*DeÞned as one-time, topic-speciÞc 
pieces. Excludes periodicals like 
monthly newsletters.
Source: GRC website.
*Defined as one-time, topic-specific pieces. Excludes periodicals 
like monthly newsletters. 
 
Source: GRC website.
Arabic
English
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tivities do not exist. This is difficult to do, because external 
actors may be poor judges of the utility of policy-related 
work, having a full appreciation of neither the problem to 
be solved nor the policy environment in which the work 
needs to be done. At the same time, superb work may not 
find a ready audience because of extraneous factors in the 
government whose policies the advocates seek to adjust. No 
perfect solution exists, but establishing a group composed 
of senior government officials from the region, a few inter-
national experts of especially high standing, and peers from 
the policy research community would be a good start. This 
group could evaluate policy-related work from throughout 
the Arab world and honor projects that have had significant 
impact as well as those that hold out great promise. Such 
a panel could also help bridge the gap between the policy 
research community and the aspects of the consulting com-
munity, highlighting the extent to which both groups are 
seeking to solve policy-related problems, albeit from dif-
ferent angles.
conclusion
As the Arab Spring demonstrated, young people sense both 
an opportunity and an urgency to become involved in the 
public policy problems their governments face, and gov-
ernments face a need to devise better solutions than they 
have been able to up to now.
U.S. institutions and government agencies have a unique 
opportunity to capitalize on these gains and begin investing 
in a more robust public policy environment in the Middle 
East. These initiatives’ most valuable return will not occur 
until years in the future. Instant experts cannot provide so-
lutions any more than today’s Arab governments can im-
mediately provide solutions to the challenges that have be-
deviled them for decades. Investing now, however, holds 
out the prospect for a more robust policy environment in 
the future and a more democratic, participatory, and peace-
ful Middle East. 
The Arab activists and protesters who have garnered so 
much attention have demonstrated the difficulty of shift-
ing from mobilization to participation in government. Simi-
larly, Arab governments have demonstrated the difficulty 
they have adjusting to more open ways of thinking. The 
processes described here will help both groups to make that 
transition, and it is very much in the interests of the citizens 
of the United States that they make it. ■
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